On April 5th, Big John, a jeans manufacturer in Kojima, Okayama, announced a restructuring plan. A public-private fund will purchase the company's debt from financial institutions, significantly reducing its 4 billion yen debt. The company will also receive a total of 300 million yen in financial support. Its headquarters factory will be closed, and production will be shifted to a Chinese subsidiary and local partner factories. In conjunction with this plan, Chairman Hiroaki Ozaki and President Atsushi Ozaki, both members of the founding family, stepped down, and Osamu Ichihara, East Japan Area Manager of the Tokyo Branch, was promoted to the new president. Sales peaked at 18.2 billion yen in the fiscal year ending January 1993, but fell to 2.5 billion yen by the fiscal year ending January 2013. Bobson filed for bankruptcy in June of last year. Similarly, Edwin's massive concealment of losses was discovered at the end of August, leaving the company in the midst of a restructuring crisis. All three of these companies, which had dominated Japan's leading national jeans brands, have now faced bankruptcy. Levi Strauss Japan, a non-domestic manufacturer, has also seen its sales fall below 10 billion yen and continues to post losses.

When asked why major jeans manufacturers are struggling, general newspapers and economic magazines stereotypically attribute it to "competition by low-priced jeans." However, this is only one factor, not the whole story. Bobson and Big John, in particular, have focused on mass-market jeans priced at 3,900 yen since the late 1990s. Therefore, the analysis that they were "competed by low prices" doesn't make sense.

The collapse of Bobson and Big John likely stems from their brands being knocked off the shelves of jeans chain stores. Today, jeans chain stores are dominated by Levi's, Edwin, and Lee.

However, sales at these jeans chain stores have fallen since their peak, and Levi's and Edwin, who should have been winners in that market, are also struggling. This likely reflects the loss of consumer support for traditional specialty stores that were heavily reliant on national brand jeans. While jeans specialty stores stocked tops, their sales primarily came from jeans from major national brands. During the high-growth and bubble periods, jeans simply sold, so they largely ignored the merchandising and visual merchandising that department store apparel and SPA brands had focused so enthusiastically on. Meanwhile, jeans manufacturers also became immersed in this model. Many jeans specialty stores adopted a consumption purchasing system rather than a purchasing system. Levi's was perhaps the only manufacturer that purchased jeans. Jeans manufacturers (with the exception of Levi's) mass-produced jeans in their own factories each season and shipped them to jeans specialty stores. Seasonal items like corduroy and light-weight denim, with the exception of standard items, were replaced each season. Manufacturers would take back unsold jeans and replace them with new items. This inventory would accumulate at the manufacturer. Since the late 1990s, jeans manufacturers have consistently opened stores in outlet malls due to this inventory problem. However, because in-house factories continue to produce jeans daily, inventory does not easily decrease. This is the reason why jeans manufacturers with their own factories fell into difficulties.

Furthermore, since the mid-1990s, consumer tastes have diversified with the rise of vintage brands, high-end import brands, SPA brands, and so on. Naturally, consumers' purchasing sources have also diversified, and sales have declined at jeans specialty store chains that focus on national brands.

The struggles of major jeans manufacturers and jeans specialty store chains are due to a combination of these factors, and improvement will not be easy.